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To Have and to Hold, for Richer or Richer:  
Premarital Agreements in the Comparative 
Context 
Margaret Ryznar* and Anna Stępień-Sporek** 
INTRODUCTION 
The premarital agreement,1 which permits prospective 
spouses to plan for divorce, may well be the world’s most 
unromantic document.2  Envisioning the end of a marriage not 
yet begun, prospective couples must divide property not yet 
acquired.  They must select a legal framework governing their 
marriage and divorce.  Lawyers are often invited to participate in 
the negotiations, fuelling prospective spouses in their demands.  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, many people prefer to avoid 
requesting a premarital agreement, despite judicial and social 
gains in the acceptance of such agreements. 
However, odds do not favor lifelong marriages3 and when 
divorce ensues, many people resent their divorce settlements.4  
Premarital agreements will therefore always have an important 
role in many engagements, particularly when one of the partners 
 
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School; M.A., Jagiellonian University; B.A., University of 
Chicago.  The authors would like to thank Meagan Tom and her colleagues on Chapman 
Law Review for phenomenal editorial assistance. 
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Gdańsk School of Law, Poland.  Doctor 
and Master of Law, University of Gdańsk. 
 1 For a precise definition of the premarital agreement in United States law, also 
known as a prenuptial or antenuptial agreement, see infra Part I.A.  In Europe, the term 
“marital agreement” is used to describe both premarital agreements and marital 
agreements, but not agreements made by spouses after a divorce.  See infra Part II. 
 2 Most unromantically, premarital agreements signal divorce to many prospective 
spouses.  See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1441 (2008) (suggesting premarital agreements signal the 
possibility of divorce); Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 2021 
(2000) (suggesting premarital agreements signal distrust); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1667, 1718 (2008) (identifying, as a classic example of signaling behavior, the lack of a 
prenuptial agreement as a means of signaling love prior to a marriage). 
 3 In 2003, there was one divorce for every two marriages.  National Vital Statistics 
Reports: Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2003, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (United States Department of Health and Human 
Services), June 10, 2004, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/ 
nvsr52_22.pdf. 
 4 See infra notes 67, 78, and 81 for examples of potential inequalities of bargaining 
power between spouses. 
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has noteworthy assets.  For example, Hollywood actress 
Catherine Zeta-Jones reportedly contracted with actor Michael 
Douglas to receive $2.8 million per year of marriage upon 
divorce, and if she proved his infidelity, for an additional $5 
million.5  Meanwhile, the premarital agreement between actress 
Nicole Kidman and singer Keith Urban would purportedly pay 
Urban about $640,000 for every year that he spent with Kidman, 
unless he used illegal drugs during the marriage, in which case 
he would receive nothing.6  Finally, in light of the public 
speculation on his marital fidelity, golfer Tiger Woods reportedly 
amended his premarital agreement, contracting to pay his wife 
significantly more upon divorce if she refrained from filing for 
divorce in the immediate future.7 
These illustrations underscore the inordinate power of 
premarital agreements in shifting wealth between spouses and 
discouraging undesirable marital behavior.  They also symbolize, 
to people around the world, the typical use of the premarital 
agreement: to divide property upon divorce.  The simplicity of 
this popular understanding, however, belies the complexity of 
premarital agreements.  In essence, the premarital agreement 
permits a circumvention of the statutory defaults governing 
spouses’ rights and responsibilities not only during divorce or 
death, but also during marriage.  Furthermore, when legislation 
or case law alters these rights and responsibilities,8 premarital 
agreements protect spouses from being governed by the 
unexpected changes in the law. 
 
 5 Jae-Ha Kim, Split Ends, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, 
http://jaehakim.com/articles/lifestyles/prenup.htm. 
 6 Ten Craziest Prenuptial Agreements, MYWEDDING.COM, http://www.my 
wedding.com/blogs/mywed/2008/02/ten-craziest-prenuptial-agreements.html (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2009). 
 7 See, e.g., Bill Zwecker, Woods, Wife In Intense Marriage Counseling, CHICAGO 
SUN-TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.suntimes.com/entertainment/zwecker/1916410, 
zwecker-tiger-woods-marriage-elin-prenup-120209.article. 
 8 One example of shifting divorce laws is found in England.  See Margaret Ryznar, 
All’s Fair in Love and War: But What About in Divorce?  The Fairness of Property Division 
in American and English Big Money Divorce Cases, N.D. LAW REV. (forthcoming 2010).  
Nonetheless, premarital agreements are still rare in England; currently only 2% of 
married and divorced people in the United Kingdom have them.  Divorce Lawyers Braced 
for Busiest Week Ever, TIMES ONLINE, January 5, 2009, http://business. 
timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5450552.ece.  One reason for the rarity of such 
agreements might be their unenforceability, although courts often defer to them in 
determining appropriate ancillary relief.  However, the enforceability of premarital 
agreements may soon be guaranteed in England, particularly if that is the 
recommendation of the influential Law Commission.  See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About 
Marriage, 40 WM AND MARY L. REV. 145, 150 n.18 (1998); Pre-nuptial and Post-nuptial 
Agreements, LAW COMMISSION, available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/ 
marital_property.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009). 
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However, premarital agreements are not without their 
problems.  Their enforceability in the United States is subject to 
procedural and substantive review.9  They also universally raise 
public policy issues with regard to the meaning of fairness and 
the limits on freedom of contract.  Such issues heighten in the 
case of mobile couples, which include those who move both inter-
state10 and internationally.11  Given these issues, it is beneficial 
to consider the premarital agreement in the comparative context.  
This is particularly true as state courts and legislatures continue 
to encounter and address the unresolved issues surrounding 
premarital agreements. 
Although England and the United States have similar 
understandings of such agreements,12 the meaning and 
consequences of premarital agreements in continental Europe 
markedly differ from the Anglo-American common law tradition, 
heightening the opportunity for a comparative study.  However, 
while the European approach inherently offers significant insight 
into the purpose, limits, and effects of premarital agreements, 
this approach is not as well-known—even to many Europeans—
as the American approach, made so famous through Hollywood 
examples. 
This Article therefore endeavors to consider and develop the 
notion of the premarital agreement in the comparative law 
context, addressing some of the universal issues surrounding 
premarital agreements, as well as the particular nuances of 
certain regulatory frameworks governing this type of agreement.  
Part I begins by exploring premarital agreements in American 
law, while Part II reviews the European approach to such 
agreements, focusing on Poland’s representative approach, but 
also considering the approaches of France, Germany, and 
Switzerland.  Part III draws lessons from a comparison of these 
various approaches, concluding that much of the distinction 
between American and European law on premarital agreements 
stems from the differing limits placed on the prospective spouses’ 
freedom of contract.  Part III also considers the desirable level of 
freedom of contract, the ideal characteristics of the regulatory 
framework of premarital agreements, and, finally, the popularity 
of such agreements. 
 
 9 See infra Part I.D.1 for further discussion. 
 10 See infra note 49. 
 11 International dating and marriage has been facilitated by online dating and mail 
order bride programs.  Premarital agreements in such cases can be particularly one-sided.  
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P.3d 1, 2–4 (Mont. 2004). 
 12 But see supra note 8 (noting the unenforceability of premarital agreements in 
England, which is different from the enforceability of such agreements in the United 
States). 
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I.  PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, family law has traditionally remained 
in the domain of the states.13  Therefore, American law regarding 
premarital agreements has developed independently in each 
state, whether by statute or case law.  Even with the introduction 
of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983) (“UPAA”), the 
law on premarital agreements is far from uniform. 
The premarital agreement in the United States has been 
rapidly developing since 1970, when courts began abandoning 
their public policy reasons against enforcing such agreements.14  
Posner v. Posner15 became one of the first cases permitting the 
enforceability of premarital agreements in the 1970’s, while the 
UPAA prompted state legislatures to begin drafting statutes on 
the subject in the 1980’s. 
Even today, premarital agreements are subject to certain 
procedural and substantive limits before a court will uphold their 
validity.  Such agreements also raise important questions of 
fairness, which state law strives to resolve.  Before turning to 
these questions, however, this Article reviews the brief history 
and current meaning of premarital agreements in the United 
States. 
A. Definition of Premarital Agreement 
At the outset, it is important to define the American 
premarital agreement, also known as a prenuptial or antenuptial 
agreement, because its meaning and consequences differ notably 
from those of the European marital agreement.16 
The UPAA defines a premarital agreement as “an agreement 
between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage 
and to be effective upon marriage.”17  This definition, however, 
does not reflect the inordinate power of the premarital 
agreement, which permits prospective spouses to regulate their 
 
 13 See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a 
traditional area of state concern.”). 
 14 However, the notion of a premarital agreement has a long history in both England 
and the United States.  For a brief description of this history, see Sarah Ann Smith, The 
Unique Agreements: Premarital and Marital Agreements, Their Impact Upon Estate 
Planning, and Proposed Solutions to Problems Arising at Death, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 833, 
840 (1992) and Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the 
Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349, 352–54 (2007). 
 15 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970). 
 16 Continental Europe and the United States significantly differ in their approaches 
to premarital agreements, while England shares more similarities with the United States 
on the subject.  See infra Part II and note 107.  But see supra note 8. 
 17 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1 (1983). 
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rights and responsibilities not only during divorce or death,18 but 
also during marriage.19 
In the United States, spouses have significant freedom of 
contract when it comes to premarital agreements.  Spouses may 
use the agreement to simply assign a piece of property, such as a 
house, to one of the spouses.  Spouses may also completely opt 
out of the default property distribution regime of their state,20 
which would otherwise govern their property distribution upon 
divorce. 
Specifically, each state has a default property distribution 
regime of either: 1) equitable distribution, which means a fair but 
not necessarily equal division between the spouses,21 or 2) 
community property, which often results in a roughly equal 
division of marital property between the spouses.22  Given their 
 
 18 “Since [the mid-nineteenth century] an arrangement in advance regarding each 
spouse’s rights to the other’s estate at death has been an acceptable subject for a 
premarital agreement.”  Smith, supra note 14, at 840.  Estate planning should therefore 
carefully consider the property classifications created by a premarital agreement.  See id. 
at 855. 
 19 Describing different types of prenuptial agreements: 
First, a prenuptial agreement may shield wealth acquired by one spouse before 
marriage from the other.  See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 594, 
428 N.E.2d 810, 813 (1981); DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432, 435, 
511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Ch. Div. 1986).  Second, a prenuptial agreement may 
stipulate a division of property that is acquired during marriage.  See, e.g., 
Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Gant v. Gant, 329 
S.E.2d 106, 109 & n.1 (W. Va. 1985).  Third, the contract may predetermine the 
amount and timing of support one spouse will pay to the other after separation 
or divorce.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 69 Haw. 497, 499, 748 P.2d 1362, 1364 
(1988); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 387-88, 286 N.E.2d 42, 43-44 (1972).  
Finally, some commentators have advocated the use of prenuptial agreements 
to structure the terms of the ongoing relationship.  See L. WEITZMAN, THE 
MARRIAGE CONTRACT 225-54 (1981); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: 
A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 219-23 (1982). 
Recent Developments, Family Law—Prenuptial Agreements—Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court Rejects Substantive Review of Prenuptial Agreements—Simeone v. Simeone, 581 
A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), 104 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1399 n.3 (1991). 
 20 See, e.g., Christine Davis, Note, ‘Til Debt Do Us Part: Premarital Contracting 
Around Community Property Law—An Evaluation of Schlaefer v. Financial Management 
Service, Inc., 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1051, 1055–57 (2000) (describing the effects on creditors of 
a prospective spouse’s decision to opt out of a default community property regime through 
a premarital agreement); Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the 
Marital Partnership Theory Through the Dual Classification System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115 
(1997) (examining both default property distribution regimes in the United States). 
 21 For further discussion of the equitable distribution principle, see Ryznar, supra 
note 8. 
 22 In the community property regime, marriage is treated as a partnership in which 
property and debts acquired during the marriage belong to both spouses in equal, 
undivided shares.  WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 1971).  The community property approach to the 
distribution of property upon divorce is the default approach in only a minority of states, 
which currently includes Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.  See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial 
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contractual freedom, if prospective spouses reside in an equitable 
distribution state, they may contract for a community property 
division.  If they reside in a community property state, they are 
free to write a premarital agreement that would keep their 
property separate.23  Prospective spouses may also enter into a 
premarital agreement that changes the characterization of 
particular property that would otherwise be characterized as 
community under the state’s default regime.24 
The characterization of property is especially important in 
terms of determining which property one spouse’s creditors may 
collect against.25  This is particularly true in community property 
states.26  A debtor’s marriage in an equitable distribution state 
has no impact on creditors, unless the debt is incurred to buy 
household necessities.27  In a community property state, however, 
creditors’ rights expand as a result of the debtor’s marriage: debt 
may be collected from the spouse’s resources brought into the 
marriage.28 
Premarital agreements or, if entered into after wedlock, 
matrimonial agreements may therefore impact how property is 
 
Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 370 (2005–
06).  See also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2550–56 (West 2004). 
 23 See, e.g., Elia v. Pifer, 977 P.2d. 796, 806 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (“We therefore 
conclude that a valid premarital agreement abrogating community property rights 
precludes a creditor of one spouse from proceeding against the separate property of the 
other spouse on a claim arising during marriage.”);; Leasefirst v. Borrelli, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
114, 116 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a “third-party creditor will not be entitled to recover 
against former community assets transmuted into separate property” by a premarital 
agreement (citing Olean Tile Co. v. Schultze, 169 Cal. App .3d 359, 365-65 (Cal. 1985)).  
See also Smith, supra note 14, at 836. 
 24 Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community 
Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 43 (2007). 
 25 Erik Paul Smith, Comment, The Uncertainty of Community Property for the 
Tortious Liabilities of One of the Spouses: Where the Law Is Uncertain, There Is No Law, 
30 IDAHO L. REV. 799 (1994). 
 26 For background on when and how creditors can reach community property to 
satisfy the debts of one of the spouses in community property states, see id.  See also 
Smith, supra note 14 (analyzing the impact of premarital agreements under California 
law). 
 27 “In many non-community property states, a nonearning spouse also may incur 
debts for which the earning spouse is liable.  Under the doctrine of necessaries, the 
earning spouse is responsible for payment of expenses incurred by the nonearning spouse 
for those things that are necessary for the family.”  Susan Kalinka, Taxation of 
Community Income: It Is Time for Congress to Override Poe v. Seaborn, 58 LA. L. REV. 73, 
94 (1997).  “Necessity” is determined by examining factors such as the spouses’ means, 
social position, and circumstances.  Id. 
 28 Carroll, supra note 24, at 29.  See also Lisa R. Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The 
Case Against Joint Bank Accounts, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 45, 78–79 (2006) (“Since 
creditors can potentially garnish all community property in a joint account, in community 
property states when a creditor of one spouse wants to garnish a joint account, courts 
must first determine whether the money in the account is community property, separate 
property or joint tenancy property.”). 
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held during the marriage and its effect on third persons, such as 
creditors.  This is particularly important in the nine community 
property states, and, to give notice to creditors, sometimes these 
agreements must be recorded in order to be binding on third 
parties.29  Nonetheless, as the vast majority of states utilize 
equitable distribution as a default—thereby blocking a creditors’ 
access to the property of the debtor’s spouse—the premarital 
agreement in the United States typically has the most 
significance upon divorce when the agreement governs its terms. 
Premarital agreements may be drafted to either significantly 
favor or disfavor the more vulnerable spouse upon divorce.30  For 
example, a homemaker might include a provision that if his or 
her spouse is unfaithful, and therefore caused the divorce, that 
spouse must pay a significant portion of the assets.31  On the 
other hand, a significantly lower-income spouse might contract to 
keep his or her minimal financial marital contributions, leaving 
the other spouse with the bulk of the assets.  Premarital 
agreements may also be drafted more neutrally toward both 
parties, so that each maintains some significant assets. 
It is important, however, to distinguish the premarital 
agreement from the separation agreement, which permits 
already married spouses to contract the terms of their divorce.  
Cohabiting couples, meanwhile, may not enter into premarital 
agreements, which become effective only upon marriage.32 
Another important distinction is that between premarital 
and postmarital agreements—a distinction that does not clearly 
exist in the European countries.33  Postmarital, also known as 
postnuptial, agreements are similar in substance and procedure 
to premarital agreements, except that they are signed after 
marriage.  They are used to change provisions in the premarital 
agreement, or if not already covered by a premarital agreement, 
to make initial provisions, during the marriage, on the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties upon divorce or death.  Therefore, 
the main difference between premarital and postmarital 
agreements is their timing in relation to the marriage. 
 
 29 Carroll, supra note 24, at 32; see also infra Part III.B. 
 30 “Since premarital contracting could be utilized by women to overcome gendered 
inequalities through marriage, summarily dismissing [premarital agreements] would 
deny women the possibility of using private ordering for empowerment and 
advancement.”  Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting 
Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147, 152 (1996). 
 31 See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 32 For a survey of the law on property distribution following an unsuccessful 
cohabitation, see Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381 
(2001). 
 33 See infra Part II. 
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The premarital agreement is thus an important type of 
contract with the power to govern a marriage and potential 
divorce.34  The terms, meaning, and consequences of such 
agreements in the United States have further been clarified 
through judicial and legislative law. 
B. A Brief History of the Premarital Agreement 
Among the most important milestones in the evolution of the 
American premarital agreement are Posner v. Posner,35 the first 
notable judicial recognition of the enforcement of premarital 
agreements, and the UPAA,36 an influential draft of statutory 
law on the subject. 
1.  Case Law 
Posner v. Posner is often cited as the first case upholding the 
validity of premarital agreements, making Florida the first state 
to recognize such agreements.37  In its opinion, the Posner court 
noted the artificial distinction in other states’ case law that 
skirted the issue of the validity of prenuptial agreements, but 
permitted spouses to contract their own property settlements 
under narrow circumstances.38  The court also took “judicial 
notice of the fact that the ratio of marriages to divorces has 
reached a disturbing rate in many states.”39  Therefore, the court 
concluded that premarital agreements may be upheld under 
certain conditions. 
The Posner court also noted the differing viewpoints of the 
appellate judges it overruled in the case, whose views 
summarized the predominant stances on the premarital 
agreement at the time.  These views included that 1) the trial 
court need not be bound by premarital agreements, though they 
are permissible, 2) premarital agreements may be void on public 
policy grounds, and 3) premarital agreements may be as binding 
on the trial court as an agreement settling one spouse’s property 
 
 34 This power of the premarital agreements might be used to achieve fairer results 
between the spouses following divorce.  Currently, many women struggle to keep their 
households running on a reduced income after a divorce.  In 1993, the mean income for 
divorced American mothers was $17,859, while for divorced fathers it was $31,034.  
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. 
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 6 (1995).  But see generally Kelly Bedard & Olivier Deschênes, 
Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the Economic Status of Women, 40 THE 
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES 411 (2005) (arguing that divorced women live in 
households with more income per person than never-divorced women). 
 35 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970). 
 36 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (1983). 
 37 233 So. 2d at 384. 
 38 Id. at 383. 
 39 Id. at 384. 
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rights upon the death of the other spouse.40  In overruling the 
lower court, Posner marked the shift from the judicial practice of 
voiding premarital agreements to a policy that recognized 
premarital agreements as binding. 
Although most states acknowledged the enforceability of 
premarital agreements soon after Posner,41 state courts 
continued to play a significant role in defining the appropriate 
parameters of premarital contracts.42  For example, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio outlined procedural safeguards in Gross v. Gross,43 
while a Massachusetts court recently found that pregnancy does 
not negate a bride’s free will to enter into a premarital 
agreement.44  In Rhode Island, both parties need not have 
counsel in order for a premarital agreement to be valid.45  In New 
Jersey, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be used to 
validate an otherwise invalid agreement.46 
However, states have become clearly divided on certain 
issues, such as the formalities that must attend such 
agreements47 and whether parties could contract on issues such 
as spousal support.48  These interstate inconsistencies were most 
problematic for mobile couples.49  The UPAA, considered next, 
aimed to remedy some of these inconsistencies. 
 
 40 Id. at 382. 
 41 See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (finding that a less 
deferential approach to the enforcement of premarital agreements would entail 
“[p]aternalistic presumptions and protections [that sheltered] women from the 
inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as having”). 
 42 See, e.g., Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (deciding 
that a premarital agreement signed the day before a wedding was voidable, but aggrieved 
party may ratify it); Chubbuck v. Lake, 635 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. 2006) (finding that a 
premarital agreement was void and unenforceable when it failed to meet the statutory 
requirement that it be witnessed by two people); Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 141 P.3d 
705, 712 (Wyo. 2006) (determining that the laws governing the enforceability of contracts 
also govern premarital agreements). 
 43 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984).  The Gross court stated that: 
[Premarital] agreements are valid and enforceable . . . (1) if they have been 
entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; (2) if there 
was full disclosure, or full knowledge and understanding of the nature, value 
and extent of the prospective spouse’s property;; and (3) if the terms do not 
promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce. 
Id. 
 44 Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687, 693 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
 45 Marsocci v. Marsocci, 911 A.2d 690, 698 (R.I. 2006). 
 46 In re Estate of Shinn, 925 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 47 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 2 cmt (1983). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Such movement often triggers conflict-of-law issues.  The UPAA, which permits 
prospective spouses to select “the choice of law governing the construction of the 
agreement,” was specifically drafted to address “[t]he problems . . . exacerbated by the 
mobility of our population.”  UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT Prefatory Note, § 3 cmt 
(1983).  See also infra note 51. 
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2.  Statutory Law 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws promulgated the UPAA in 1983 to provide a uniform law on 
premarital agreements.  Approximately half of the states have 
now adopted some variation of the UPAA.50 
One of the most important characteristics of the UPAA is its 
strong support of the freedom of contract.  Section 3 of the Act 
lists several topics a premarital agreement may cover, including 
property rights, spousal support, and the choice of law governing 
the agreement.51  Significantly, this list is not exhaustive and 
parties may contract on any topic not in violation of either a 
public policy principle or a criminal statute.52  The only topic 
explicitly forbidden from premarital contracting is child support 
that adversely affects the child, although as a general rule many 
child-related provisions are typically considered to be against 
public policy.53 
Enforcement of premarital agreements is considered in 
section 6 of the UPAA.54  This section provides that a premarital 
agreement is unenforceable against a spouse who did not execute 
the agreement voluntarily.55  The premarital agreement is also 
unenforceable if it was unconscionable when executed and the 
spouse: (1) was not provided fair disclosure of the other spouse’s 
financial details; (2) did not waive the right to receive such 
disclosure; and, (3) did not have adequate knowledge of those 
financial details.56  Therefore, a person with knowledge of a 
spouse’s financial status or reason to know of it, coupled with 
voluntary execution, cannot contest the premarital agreement.57  
 
 50 Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-Source Property Acquired in 
Another State (And Its Impact on a Montana Marriage Dissolution, Estate Planning, 
Property Transfers, and Probate), 69 MONT. L. REV. 313, 365 (2008).  For examples of 
various states’ UPAA-based laws, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 2004); 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 10/1 et seq. (West 1993); and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-17-6 (2003). 
 51 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (1983).  See also Montoya v. Montoya, 909 
A.2d 947 (Conn. 2006); Bradley v. Bradley, 164 P.3d 537 (Wyo. 2007).  For an excellent 
discussion of choice of law issues in premarital agreements, see Julia Halloran 
McLaughlin, Premarital Agreements and Choice of Law: “One, Two, Three, Baby, You and 
Me,” 72 MO. L. REV. 793 (2007). 
 52 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 cmt (1983). 
 53 Id. 
 54 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (1983).  For constructive criticism of the 
UPAA’s enforcement provision, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering 
Concerns About the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127 (1993).  
Meanwhile, section 7 of the UPAA governs enforceability of agreements in marriages that 
were subsequently determined to be void.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 7 
(1983). 
 55 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT at § 6. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at § 6 cmt. 
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Similarly, a person who waived knowledge of these financial 
details and voluntarily executed the agreement is bound by it.58   
Although the UPAA is a source of some guidance, the law on 
premarital agreements remains in the realm of the states and 
any generalization is therefore difficult.  Nonetheless, it is a fair 
observation that American states typically provide prospective 
spouses significant contractual freedom and premarital 
agreements are enforceable unless they fail judicial review.59 
C. Theoretical Underpinnings   
The modern premarital agreement is rooted in contract law 
theories.60  Parties to a premarital agreement, viewed as 
independent negotiators,61 have almost full discretion over the 
contents and scope of their agreement, enabling them to dictate 
the terms of their divorce absent any enforceability issues.62  This 
is particularly important for community property states such as 
California, where parties may waive their rights to share 
property.63 
Many commentators have noted that marriage itself has 
evolved from a relationship based on status to one regulated by 
contract.64  This shift from marriage as regulated by the state to 
marriage as determined by the private ordering between parties 
has been called “the privatization of family law.”65 
 
 58 Id.  There is an additional provision that bars enforcement of a premarital 
agreement to the extent that it would force the lower income spouse onto welfare.  Id. at 
§ 6(b). 
 59 See infra Part I.D.1. 
 60 “[A] premarital agreement is a contract.  As required for any other contract, the 
parties must have the capacity to contract in order to enter into a binding agreement.”  
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2 cmt (1983).  The UPAA also draws upon contract 
and commercial law for the standard of unconscionability.  Id. at § 6 cmt. 
 61 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in THE 
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 201 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) [hereinafter FALL 
AND RISE OF CONTRACT]. 
 62 See infra Part I.D.1. 
 63 See supra Part I.A. 
 64 Scott & Scott, supra note 61, at 201.  Marriage as status means, in essence, that 
family law automatically bestows a set of rights and obligations upon people who are 
marrying, which can be altered only by divorce, not by mutual agreement.  For an 
excellent discussion of the interplay between marriage as status and marriage as 
contract, see Lisa Milot, Note, Restitching the American Marital Quilt: Untangling 
Marriage from the Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701 (2001); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce 
and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts 
and Dissociation under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993).  For a description of 
freedom of contract in covenant marriage, which is a more binding form of marriage 
available in a few states, see Margaret F. Brinig, Contracting Around No-Fault Divorce, 
in FALL AND RISE OF CONTRACT, supra note 61, at 275. 
 65 Scott & Scott, supra note 61, at 203.  It is important to note here, however, that 
there is a major distinction between (1) marital behavior being governed by contract and 
(2) divorce being governed by contract.  See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status 
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However, there are obvious distinctions between contracts 
and premarital agreements, casting doubt on whether contract 
law provides an appropriate framework for premarital 
agreements.66  Most problematically, the bargaining process in 
the marital context is not at arm’s length, but “may be afflicted 
by unreflective love, even infatuation.”67  Additionally, the 
characteristics of marriage, so dependent on life circumstances 
and children, are sufficiently unique to prevent the blind 
application of pure contract principles.68 
Nonetheless, premarital agreements are often defended on 
partnership principles as well.69  There are inconsistencies, 
however, in the notion that premarital agreements inherently 
advance the prospective spouses’ equality.  Specifically, a court’s 
ability to invalidate a premarital agreement suggests that one of 
the partners is too weak to contract.70  Conversely, if a court 
upholds skewed premarital agreements, then spouses may 
bargain for unequal treatment.  It has been suggested that 
premarital agreements must move in the direction of dividing 
property equally, or else they are at odds with the view of 
marriage as a partnership.71  This proposition, however, would 
defeat the entire purpose of a premarital agreement, which is to 
provide parties a method of contracting around defaults.  
Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether premarital agreements 
enhance or undermine the idea of marriage as an equal 
partnership.  They may certainly be used by parties to effectively 
do either, depending on the terms of the agreement.  
 
of Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1039 (1983) (reviewing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE 
MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981)). 
 66 Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in FALL AND RISE OF CONTRACT, 
supra note 61, at 256. 
 67 Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in FALL AND RISE OF CONTRACT, 
supra note 61, at 254.  For the argument that premarital contracting creates greater 
equality of bargaining power than either intramarital or postmarital bargaining, see 
generally id. 
 68 Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1996, 2096–97 (2003). 
 69 See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt (1983), which prioritizes 
protecting spouses “against overreaching, concealment of assets, and sharp dealing not 
consistent with the obligations of marital partners to deal fairly with each other.”  
(emphasis added). 
 70 This recalls the days when women could not legally contract.  See, e.g., Poole v. 
Perkins, 101 S.E. 240 (Va. 1919). 
 71 Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, supra note 68, at 
2096: 
[D]eference to freedom of contract in antenuptial agreement law is 
undesirable. . . . [A]cknowledgment of the partnership conception of marriage 
demands that parties desiring to execute antenuptial agreements approximate 
the fifty-fifty division of property implicit in the partnership approach or stand 
prepared to prove the agreements’ substantive fairness at the time of divorce. 
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Although both the partnership and contractual frameworks 
have flaws when applied to the marital context, they have 
underpinned and legitimized premarital agreements.  As a 
result, couples have benefited from the opportunity to 
contractually circumvent judicial and statutory defaults in the 
case of divorce. 
D. Enforceability  
Section six of the UPAA,72 or the corresponding state statute, 
governs the enforceability of premarital agreements.  However, it 
is the courts that are the ultimate arbiters of whether a 
particular premarital agreement governs the terms of divorce.73  
The issue of enforceability arises most frequently following a 
court’s procedural and substantive review of a premarital 
agreement.74 
1.  Judicial Review 
In order to be upheld by the court, a premarital agreement 
must survive substantive and procedural review.75  Occasionally, 
these separate inquiries are blurred.76  In other words, if the 
substance of the agreement appears fair to the court, defects in 
the bargaining process may be of lesser importance.  However, if 
the agreement seems particularly unfair to one spouse, courts 
may examine the procedures surrounding its execution more 
closely.77 
In terms of substantive review,78 some courts have departed 
from the standard unconscionability doctrine by which 
 
 72 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (1983).  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 73 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(c) (1983) (“An issue of 
unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of 
law.”). 
 74 Some commentators have warned that enforcement of premarital agreements 
must be done carefully so as to not disadvantage women.  See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 54, 
at 129. 
 75 For the argument that courts rarely invalidate premarital agreements following 
procedural and substantive review, see Younger, supra note 14, at 358–59, 422–23.  One 
commentator suggests that the procedural and substantive fairness protections placed on 
premarital agreements reflect each state’s view of the appropriate balance between 
individual autonomy and state oversight of premarital agreements.  McLaughlin, supra 
note 51, at 853. 
 76 Younger, supra note 14, at 356–57. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Karen Servidea, Note, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the State’s 
Interests in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535, 540–41 (2005).  Some critics argue that a 
substantive review of premarital agreements is paternalistic.  See Simeone v. Simeone, 
581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990). 
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commercial contracts are evaluated.79  Instead, judges often 
examine the fairness of the premarital agreement at the time of 
divorce.80  Furthermore, certain topics fall outside the scope of 
permissible contracting for public policy reasons,81 including a 
child’s religion,82 child custody, child care payments, or parental 
visitation.   
Meanwhile, the test for procedural fairness focuses on the 
parties’ conduct in obtaining the premarital agreement.83  First, 
each party must have voluntarily entered into the agreement, 
absent fraud, overreaching, sharp dealing,84 or duress.85  
Additionally, at the time the parties entered into the agreement, 
disclosure of each party’s financial status is required.86  
Significant departure from these accepted procedural practices 
provides courts with the opportunity to circumvent premarital 
agreements in resolving the issues arising during divorce 
proceedings. 
 
 79 But see supra notes 60 and 73; Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006) (finding 
that although public policy does not render antenuptial agreements per se invalid, such 
agreements may be analyzed by courts as unconscionable). 
 80 Servidea, supra note 78, at 540–41. 
 81 I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 
1169 (2008).  See also Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in FALL AND RISE OF 
CONTRACT, supra note 61, at 256 (“Aside from the restrictions on termination provisions 
in prenuptial agreements, potential mates cannot bind themselves legally to marriages in 
which spouses’ domestic, financial, and sharing obligations are specified by contract.  
Polygamous and same-sex marriages are prohibited.  These laws are not default rules, but 
restrictions on freedom of marital contract.”).  For the argument that courts should lift 
restrictions on marital contracting to obtain less paternalistic and more efficient results, 
see Milot, supra note 64.  Other scholars have similarly argued for even greater 
contractual freedom.  See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership 
Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 
558 (1974); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for 
State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982).  But see Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards 
and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1399 (1984) (arguing that absolute freedom of contract may hinder fair results upon 
divorce). 
 82 See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).  See also Alexandra 
Selfridge, Challenges for Negotiating and Drafting an Antenuptial Agreement for the 
Religious Upbringing of Future Children, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 91 (2007). 
 83 Younger, supra note 14, at 357. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003). 
 86 See, e.g., Blige v. Blige, 656 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. 2008) (holding that both parties 
entering into an antenuptial agreement must provide a full and fair disclosure of all 
material facts); Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 (Conn. 2007) (determining that disclosure 
requirements for a premarital agreement are satisfied when the parties disclose a general 
approximation of their income, assets, and liabilities). 
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2.  Formulaic Premarital Agreements 
The question of enforceability plagues not only procedurally 
and substantively complicated agreements,87 but also simple 
ones.  Any internet search reveals premarital agreement 
packages with boilerplate language, allowing the prospective 
spouses to sign formulaic contracts without spending money on 
attorneys’ fees.88 
Ultimately, form premarital agreements are not inherently 
more or less enforceable than those drafted by lawyers.89  They 
are subject to the same procedural and substantive limitations as 
any other premarital agreement, thus representing a reliable 
option for low cost divorce planning. 
There are certainly advantages and disadvantages to an 
increased use of such unsophisticated premarital agreements.  
On the one hand, without lawyers, prospective spouses may not 
know the depth and scope of potential negotiations, lessening 
their bargaining power.  On the other hand, inexpensive 
premarital agreements allow spouses of modest means to plan for 
a potential divorce.90  Furthermore, because one side does not 
outmatch the other in legal power, perhaps the spouses achieve 
greater equality in such negotiations. 
In many ways, the formulaic premarital agreement parallels 
the holographic will.  Similar public policy reasons permit both, 
centering on the autonomy of the individual to dispose of his or 
her own property.  Furthermore, the do-it-yourself premarital 
 
 87 For a good review of the complex financial issues that might be considered by a 
premarital agreement, see David M. Johnson, Complex Financial Issues in Family Law 
Cases, 37 COLO. LAW. 53 (2008). 
 88 For examples of companies that sell asset protection in marriage, see 
http://prenuptialagreementform.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (form premarital 
agreements for as low as $29.99) and http://www.legalformsbank.biz/premarital.asp (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2009) (same for $9.95).  See also Andrew Blair-Stanek, Comment, Defaults 
and Choices in the Marriage Contract: How to Increase Autonomy, Encourage Discussion, 
and Circumvent Constitutional Constraints, 24 TOURO L. REV. 31, 68 n.166 (2008). 
 89 See, e.g., UNI. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6 cmt. (1983): 
Nothing in Section 6 [regarding enforcement] makes the absence of assistance 
of independent legal counsel a condition for the unenforceability of a 
premarital agreement.  However, lack of that assistance may well be a factor in 
determining whether the conditions stated in Section 6 may have existed (see, 
e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962)). 
This UPAA provision would most likely be applicable to cases where only one of the 
parties was assisted by independent legal counsel. 
 90 Somewhat counter-intuitively, those of modest means may need premarital 
agreements the most because marriages are particularly vulnerable to dissolution when 
spouses encounter financial trouble.  See, e.g., HENRY J. SOMMER ET. AL., COLLIER FAMILY 
LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, ¶6.05[5], at xiii (2009) (“In some parts of the country as 
many as half of all marriages end in divorce, often due, at least in part, to financial 
difficulties.”). 
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agreement symbolizes the preference of the American philosophy 
for nearly complete freedom of contracting, permitting 
prospective spouses to enter into an agreement uninfluenced by 
judicial or legislative preferences.91  This cornerstone of 
American philosophy, so favorable to freedom of contract, in fact 
drives many of the distinctions between American and European 
law on the subject of premarital agreements. 
In sum, Americans may utilize the premarital agreement to 
avoid judicial and statutory defaults in their states, enjoying 
significant freedom of contract.  The force of the premarital 
agreement has been effectively developed over the past several 
decades, resulting in an important role for premarital 
agreements in many American couples’ engagements.  
Interestingly, however, premarital agreements have a longer 
history in many European countries, acquiring significantly 
different consequences and meaning. 
II.  EUROPEAN LAW ON MARITAL AGREEMENTS AS EXEMPLIFIED BY 
POLAND 
Europe generally does not share the distinction that exists in 
the United States between premarital and postmarital 
agreements.  Instead, both types of agreements are treated as 
one type of contract: the marital agreement.  The marital 
agreement may be concluded either before the marriage 
ceremony or during the marriage.92 
This Part analyzes the approaches to marital agreements in 
Europe, focusing on France, Germany, Poland, and 
Switzerland.93  The Polish approach is given more in-depth 
treatment, not only because it is representative of the others, but 
also because it illustrates notable differences from the American 
approach. 
These European legal systems have several commonalities 
that are worth mentioning at the outset.  Under the French Civil 
Code,94 the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”),95 the 
 
 91 But see sources cited supra notes 67 and 73. 
 92 But see C. CIV. 1394–97 (France). 
 93 “Comparisons among [England, France, Germany, and the United States] 
continue to seem fruitful, not only because of the great influence their legal systems exert 
in the civil and common law worlds, but also because each has generated a rich 
assortment of legal and social science materials.”  MARY ANN GLENDON, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
WESTERN EUROPE 3 (1989). 
 94 C. CIV. (France). 
 95 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt 
[RGBI] 195, as amended, §§ 1426, 1432, 1437, 1519, 1549.  
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Swiss Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (“ZGB”),96 and the Polish 
Kodeks Rodzinny i Opiekuńczy (“KRO”),97 there are a few 
optional systems of matrimonial property law aside from the 
statutory regime governing the marriage.  As a general rule, 
spouses may modify the standard statutory regime that would 
apply to their matrimonial relations by means of a marital 
agreement.98  Importantly, spouses are not obliged to choose any 
specific contractual system and can avoid at least some of the 
consequences of the standard statutory regime.99  Nonetheless, 
spouses do not have entirely unrestricted autonomy with regard 
to their matrimonial property law in any of the countries 
considered, nor is entering into a marital agreement popular.100 
A. Various European Countries’ Approaches 
It should be mentioned that prospective spouses in many 
European countries resist marital agreements altogether because 
they think that such documents are only important upon divorce.  
Therefore, spouses often do not enter into such agreements 
because they want to underscore that they are not going to 
divorce.101  Such an opinion of marital agreements derives from 
American movies and news regarding the divorces of celebrities.  
Very rarely, however, is the situation of these divorcing 
celebrities analyzed within a larger context and within the legal 
circumstances that are specific to the United States.  This is 
understandable because the main aim of movies is not to teach. 
Nonetheless, the result is that the opinion of marital 
agreements in Europe is built upon the false conviction that 
marital agreements in Europe have the same consequences as 
those in the United States, when in reality the meaning and 
consequences of such agreements in Europe differ from those in 
the United States.  In Europe, the regime choice made by the 
spouses in a marital agreement mainly impacts how property is 
held during the marriage and which property is available to the 
creditors of one spouse.102  While the rules of distribution of 
property upon divorce are also determined by the chosen regime, 
 
 96 Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 210, 
art. 177–247 (Switz.). 
 97 Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy – The Family and Guardianship Code of 25th 
February 1964 - Dz. U. nr 9, poz. 59 with amendments [hereinafter “KRO”]. 
 98 See infra Parts II.A. & II.B. for further discussion. 
 99 Id. 
 100 In France, for example, only 10% of spouses decide to enter into a marital 
agreement, and they do so mostly when important assets or second marriages are 
involved.  See CAROLYN HAMILTON & ALISON PERRY, FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 261 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 101 This might also be a signaling problem.  See supra note 2. 
 102 See, e.g., infra Part II.A.1. 
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spouses may modify them only in a very narrow way through the 
marital agreement.103 
Therefore, among the most important points to initially 
consider is that the marital agreement has a different meaning 
in Europe than in the United States, and differing meanings 
within Europe as well.104  In certain European countries, all of 
the contracts between spouses are called marital agreements.  
The permissible scope of the marital agreement also differs from 
European country to country.  In some countries, a marital 
agreement concerns only the relations between spouses, while in 
others, the agreement may regulate the consequences of a 
spouse’s death.105  Furthermore, in some countries, there are only 
a few models of property regimes from which spouses may 
choose.  In other countries, spouses are not obliged to follow the 
statutory models of the regimes and have more freedom with 
regard to the content of their marital agreements.106 
Nonetheless, two fundamental approaches to marital 
agreements can be distinguished in Europe.107  According to the 
first approach, the marital agreement is a kind of general 
agreement, constructing the rules of the classification of property 
and the relations of the spouses, but on the other hand, not 
regarding any particular property.108  The second approach is 
based on the rule that each contract between spouses is a marital 
agreement, even if it concerns only certain chattels belonging to 
one spouse.109 
1.  France 
The meaning of the term “marital agreement” is quite broad 
in France.  It covers not only the agreements in which spouses 
choose their matrimonial regime, but also the contracts 
 
 103 See, e.g., infra Part II.A.3. 
 104 This is a very important point given the current process of European unification 
and harmonization in the field of family law.  See, e.g., Esin Örücü, A Family Law for 
Europe: Necessary, Feasible, Desirable?, in PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND 
HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 551 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., Intersentia 
2003) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES].   
 105 See Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [ABGB] [Civil Code] 
Justizgesetzsammlung [JGS] No. 946/1816, as amended § 1217 (Austria).  
 106 Austria and France serve as examples of such countries.  See HAMILTON & PERRY, 
supra note 100, at 12, 260–61. 
 107 These remarks concern only continental Europe because the English approach to 
marital agreements is similar to the American one.  See, e.g., Nigel Lowe & Roger Kay, 
The Status of Prenuptial Agreements in English Law – Eccentricity or Sensible 
Pragmatism?, in FAMILY FINANCES 395–413 (Bea Verschraegen ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
FAMILY FINANCES].  But see supra note 8 (noting the lack of enforceability of premarital 
agreements in England). 
 108 See Lowe & Kay, supra note 107, at 395–413. 
 109 Id. 
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regarding every chattel belonging to at least one spouse.110  
Spouses are free to regulate the rules concerning the 
management of their property and are entitled, by any kind of 
agreement, to modify the default statutory community property 
regime.111 
There are a few models of property regimes known by the 
Civil Code in France: separation of property,112 separation in 
acquisition,113 universal community,114 and community of 
movables and acquisitions.115  Spouses may choose among these 
in their marital agreements, but are prohibited from electing 
former types of marital regimes, such as, for example, the dotal 
system.116 
If the spouses were married without any provision 
concerning matrimonial property law, the default statutory 
system of a limited community property is applied.117  In this 
system, only property acquired during the marriage is held in 
common, although gifts and inheritances acquired during the 
marriage are the separate property of each spouse.118  
Community property belongs to both spouses jointly, although 
each spouse is able to make ordinary acts of administration of 
community property.  However, important transactions relating 
to this kind of property need the consent of both spouses.119 
Importantly, when the record of marriage mentions that a 
marital agreement has not been made, third parties may assume 
 
 110 WALTER CAIRNS & ROBERT MCKEON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 69–70 
(1995). 
 111 See C. CIV. 1497 (France). 
 112 See CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 110, at 71.  In this regime, spouses hold 
property separately.  Id. 
 113 In this regime, spouses behave as if they were married under the regime of 
separation of property.  At the dissolution of the regime, each spouse receives half of the 
value of the net acquisitions belonging to the property of the other spouse.  Id. 
 114 In this regime, “the community includes not only the acquets and gains of the 
marriage, but also any property brought into the marriage by either spouse.”  Carroll, 
supra note 24, at 27.  However, property that is separate by its nature—property 
delineated as such in C. CIV. 1404 (France)—does not fall into community property, 
unless otherwise stipulated. 
 115 This system is similar to the limited community property system.  The key 
characteristic of this system is that immovables are not part of the common property of 
spouses. 
 116 The dotal system was in force during medieval times and in some areas later.  It 
was also recognized by Roman law.  In this system, the wife was typically given with a 
dower, which was administrated by her husband during the marriage and was given back 
to her upon the death of her husband.  Being a former property regime, however, it is not 
currently mentioned by the Civil Code and therefore may not be chosen by spouses today.  
See CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 110, at 71. 
 117 Some authors translate the name of this regime as the “community of ownership 
of matrimonial property.”  See HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 260. 
 118 C. CIV. 1402 (France). 
 119 C. CIV. 1421 (France). 
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that spouses have been married under the default statutory 
regime of limited community property.120  However, this rule is 
not applied if the spouses have declared, in the transaction 
entered into with a third party, that they had made a marital 
agreement.121 
The freedom of contract in the field of marital agreements is 
very well-developed in French law, especially when compared to 
the other European countries. 122  In their marital agreements, 
spouses in France may choose one of the property regimes 
mentioned by the Civil Code, but may also modify the rules of 
these regimes: spouses may mix different regimes and are even 
able to establish new regimes that are not recognized by the 
law.123  Unlike the other European countries examined here, 
spouses in France are also able to make provisions for what 
should happen upon their death.124  Spouses may also opt for 
universal community, which is not popular in Europe.125 
However, there are some limitations on this freedom of 
contract.  For example, the marital agreement cannot be against 
public order (public morals).126  Furthermore, spouses are not 
able to modify the rules of the so-called primary regime (régime 
primaire)127 and the statutory order of successions.128  Finally, 
spouses are not permitted to derogate from the rules regarding 
parental authority or guardianship,129 nor may they derogate 
from the duties and rights which result from marriage.130 
In France, marital agreements should be concluded before 
wedlock.  During the marriage, the marital agreement is 
immutable (principe d’immutabilité).131  However there is an 
 
 120 The record of marriage is a certificate given to the spouses and serves as proof 
that they are married. 
 121 C. CIV. 1394 (France). 
 122 CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 110, at 52, 69. 
 123 See HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 260–61. 
 124 This kind of provision may not necessarily be implicated in every case, as, for 
example, when certain property cannot be disposed of freely.  Id. at 261. 
 125 In this regime, “the community includes not only the acquets and gains of the 
marriage, but also any property brought into the marriage by either spouse.”  Carroll, 
supra note 24, at 27.  This prohibition in other countries is explained by the nature of 
some rights, the subject of which can only be one person. 
 126 See C. CIV. 1387 (France). 
 127 This is a catalogue of rules regarding the rights and duties of spouses from which 
no derogation may be made. This compulsory regime is laid down by the Civil Code.  Its 
provisions regard, for example, the financial contribution of spouses to household 
expenses, to the upbringing of children, as well as to the family home. 
 128 C. CIV. 1389 (France). 
 129 C. CIV. 1388 (France). 
 130 Id. 
 131 C. Civ. 1396 (France). 
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exception to this rule:132 spouses may change their financial 
relations after two years of having a particular regime.133  In any 
case, the marital agreement should be agreed upon before a 
notary and approved by the court.134  The marital agreement is 
enforceable after the decision of the court and has effect on third 
persons135 three months after mention of it has been entered into 
the margin of both copies of the record of marriage.136  Spouses 
should make a suitable motion to enter information about their 
marital regime into the record of marriage. 
The marital agreement should be concluded by prospective 
spouses, or by spouses during the marriage, even if one of them 
has not gained full legal capacity.  A minor who obtained consent 
for contracting into the marriage or an adult in guardianship or 
curatorship may enter into marital agreements, but must then be 
assisted by the person who is authorized to give consent for the 
marriage.137  The spouses may also give power of attorney to an 
agent who will conclude the marital agreement acting on his or 
her behalf.138 
It is very important that the parties be simultaneously 
present and that the marital agreement be made with the 
consent of both spouses or their agents.139  As previously 
mentioned, the marital agreement needs to be in the form of a 
notarized deed.  The notary public delivers to the spouses a 
certificate which confirms that the agreement has been 
 
 132 See C. CIV. 1397 (France). 
 133 It must be demanded that the change of a matrimonial regime be made “in the 
interest of the family.”  Id. 
 134 The court referenced here is the court of the spouses’ domicile.  Id. 
 135 This means that spouses are able to rely on the provisions of the marital 
agreement in limiting their ownership in certain property, particularly when it comes to 
the creditors of one spouse.  These provisions therefore actually determine the scope of 
property available to creditors.  This issue is particularly important in countries where 
the community of property is the default statutory regime.  In this regime, the creditor of 
one spouse typically has recourse against the community property.  But if the spouses 
limited the community property through a marital agreement, the rights of the creditor 
would be restricted.  On the other hand, if a creditor has recourse only against the 
separate property of the spouse who is the debtor, and the spouses extend the community 
property, the creditor’s position is weaker.  In this case, the creditor has recourse only 
against the separate property, such as when, for example, the debt regards the separate 
property of the spouse or the contract was concluded without the consent of the other 
spouse. 
 136 See C. CIV. 1397 (France). 
 137 See C. CIV. 148 (France). 
 138 Katharina Boele-Woelki, Matrimonial Property Law from a Comparative Law 
Perspective, in C111 SERIES ARS NOTARIATUS 7 (Hans Warendorf trans., 2000) available 
at http://www.reading.ac.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lID=7018&sID=34870 
[hereinafter “Boele-Woelki, Matrimonial Property Law”]. 
 139 C. CIV. 1394 (France). 
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completed.  This certificate must be lodged with the officer of civil 
status before the celebration of the marriage.140 
Finally, in their marital agreements, spouses may make 
provisions for a spouse’s death.  Specifically, they may decide 
that the surviving spouse be authorized to receive from the 
common property “either a specified sum, or a specified property 
in kind, or a specified quantity of a determined kind of 
property.”141  Such a provision does not affect the rights of the 
surviving spouse under inheritance law.142  Expenses arising 
during the marriage may also be allotted to each spouse by a 
marital agreement.143 
2.  Germany 
According to German law, spouses enter into a marital 
agreement (Ehevertrag) to regulate their financial 
relationships.144  This definition of marital agreement is quite 
broad and therefore the source of some doubts.  For example, it is 
not clear whether contracts made between spouses in order to 
transfer ownership of a certain part of their property should be 
treated as marital agreements. 
The marital agreement can introduce a marital regime or 
change the rules of the regime chosen by the spouses.  This 
means that the marital agreement is a special kind of tool used to 
decide the financial consequences of marriage and the financial 
relations between spouses.145  Through it, spouses may choose 
from the contractual property regimes in Germany, which 
include separation of property146 and community of property.147 
 
 140 C. CIV. 1395 (France). 
 141 C. CIV. 1515 (France). 
 142 C. CIV. 1516 (France). 
 143 According to article 214 of the French Civil Code, when spouses do not regulate 
this matter, they shall contribute to the marriage expenses in proportion to their 
respective means.  See C. CIV. 214 (France). 
 144 Only spouses can be parties to these agreements.  If other people are parties to the 
agreement, it does not qualify as a marital agreement.  See GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & 
LAWS 467 (Nigel G. Foster & Satish Sule eds., 3d ed. 2002). 
 145 See INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 257–58 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll 
eds., 2d ed. 2005).  It should be emphasized that different contracts between spouses such 
as, for example, donation or loan contracts are not marital agreements and are governed 
by the general rules of BGB (German Civil Code), instead of by the provisions regarding 
marital agreements.  INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 193 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. 
Finkin eds., 1996). 
 146 Separation of property is a regime in which spouses hold their property 
separately.  See Foster & Sule, supra note 144, at 468. 
 147 See BGB §§ 1414–1415.  Community of property is a regime in which there are 
three groups of assets: community property, the property of the wife, and the property of 
the husband.  See Foster & Sule, supra note 144, at 468.  This Part of the Article uses the 
term “community of property” to describe this specific property regime and the term 
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If the spouses have not concluded a marital agreement, they 
remain in the default statutory regime, which is community of 
surplus (Zugewinngemeinschaft).148  This name is misleading, 
however, because it is actually a regime based on separation of 
property during the marriage, with the surplus divided at the 
end of the marriage.149  If the spouses decide not to contract 
around this default statutory regime, they are free to make some 
changes to this regime.150  For example, spouses may eliminate 
some of the restrictions regarding the transfer of certain assets 
or change the rules concerning the equalization of accruals that 
determine the division of the surplus.151 
Meanwhile, if the spouses contract into the community 
property regime, they are able to establish the rules on the 
composition of each spouse’s separate capital and community 
property.152  They may also change the rules of management of 
the community property, as well as the rules regarding the 
division of common property.153 
Generally, there is some freedom of contract in marital 
agreements in Germany, but spouses must choose one of the 
regimes stated in the Civil Code.154  It is also possible to modify 
some of the statutory rules, but only within certain limits 
established by law. Spouses are not allowed to introduce any 
foreign law’s regime that is not recognized by German law.155  It 
is also forbidden to mix different regimes.156  Such limited 
freedom of contracting in marital agreements is justified by the 
desire for certainty of business and the guarantee of formality. 
In Germany, the marital agreement can be concluded by 
spouses or prospective spouses.  If a spouse does not have full 
legal capacity, German law is more restrictive than French law.  
A prospective spouse with limited legal capacity must be assisted 
by his or her legal representative and, in certain circumstances, 
 
“community property” to describe the property that belongs to both spouses in this 
regime. 
 148 Foster & Sule, supra note 144, at 468. 
 149 See Reimann & Zekoll, supra note 145, at 257.  When analyzing this regime and 
its rules, one can come to the conclusion that it should actually be called the sharing of 
accruals or the community of increase.  See GERHARD ROBBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
GERMAN LAW 283 (4th ed. 2006). 
 150 GERHARD ROBBERS, supra note 149, at 283. 
 151 Id. 
 152 BGB § 1474. 
 153 See id. 
 154 See, e.g., Reimann & Zekoll, supra note 145, at 257–58. 
 155 See 2008 Martindale-Hubbell Law Digest – European Law Digests 1 GERMANY: 
LAW DIGEST OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 13.03. 
 156 See BGB § 1409. 
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must have the approval of the court (Vormundschaftsgericht).157  
Still, both parties to the agreement must be present in front of 
the notary public.158  As in French law, the marital agreement 
should be made before a notary, but the approval of a court is not 
necessary if the agreement needs to be changed.159 
The marital agreement should be registered in a special 
register, kept by a court (Amtsgericht) and called the register of 
marital regimes (Güterrechtsregister).160  The registration makes 
the marital agreement enforceable against third persons from the 
day of its registration.161  This duty of registration ensures that 
third persons know the financial situation of the parties, 
including the property arrangements made in the marital 
agreement between the spouses that would impact the scope of 
property available to the creditors of one of the spouses.  The 
motion to register the marital agreement may be made by either 
spouse. 
Due to this registration, third persons are protected.  They 
may rely on the fact that the spouses are in the regime 
mentioned in the register.  If they are not mentioned because 
they have changed the regime but their marital agreement has 
not been published in the register, third parties are not 
affected.162  Finally, the register is public and each person who is 
interested may access it without providing a reason.163 
3.  Switzerland 
Another example of European regulation of marital 
agreements is found in Swiss law, which treats the marital 
agreement as a special kind of contract concluded by spouses or 
prospective spouses in order to choose or modify their marital 
regime.164  In such agreements, spouses are free to introduce 
general rules regarding the classification of their property and to 
modify the rules of their marital regime.165  Spouses are also able 
to choose their marital regime or change it within the limits 
introduced by law.166 
 
 157 BGB § 1411. 
 158 BGB § 1318. 
 159 BGB § 1410. 
 160 BGB § 1558. 
 161 See ROBBERS, supra note 149, at 283. 
 162 It does, however, take effect between spouses. 
 163 See BGB § 1558. 
 164 See Barbara E. Graham-Siegenthaler, Principles of Marriage Recognition Applied 
to Same-Sex Marriage Recognition in Switzerland and Europe, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 121, 
123 (1998). 
 165 See Jacques-Michel Grossen & Olivier Guillod, Family Law, in INTRODUCTION TO 
SWISS LAW, 59, 64 (F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay eds., 3d ed. 2004). 
 166 HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 670. 
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The default statutory regime is the deferred community of 
acquisitions (Errungenschaftsbeteiligung).167  In this regime, 
each spouse has his or her separate property during the marriage 
and upon divorce there is a distribution of goods.168  Spouses who 
decide to remain in this standard statutory regime are free to 
change the rules of the classification of property.169  Importantly, 
if they are entrepreneurs, spouses may choose which property 
will receive income from their commercial activities.170  They may 
also change each other’s share in acquisitions.171 
Spouses may also contract around this default and choose a 
separate property regime or one of a few types of community 
property.172  If community of property is the regime chosen by the 
spouses, they may decide that their community property will 
consist only of accruals.173  They may also establish the rules 
concerning shares in common property.174  However, there is a 
catalog of marital agreements introduced by law and it is 
forbidden to create regimes containing only certain elements of 
these different regimes.175 
The marital agreement (Ehevertrag) may be concluded by 
spouses during a marriage or by prospective spouses (Brautleute) 
before wedlock.176  In order to conclude a valid marital 
agreement, spouses must possess legal capacity and the contract 
must be publicly authenticated.177  Importantly, the marital 
agreement may be changed at any time during marriage.178  
Contrary to German law, the ZGB does not contain any 
requirements to publish the marital agreement in a register, 
however, a marital agreement can be mentioned in a commercial 
register.179 
B. The Polish Approach 
The main subject of the European Part of this Article is 
Poland’s approach to marital agreements.  Polish law is 
interesting for two reasons.  First, the Polish approach is 
different from the American one in many respects.  Second, 
 
 167 Id.  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See ZGB art. 216–217. 
 172 HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 670. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 673. 
 175 Id. 
 176 ZGB art. 179. 
 177 See ZGB art. 180–181. 
 178 HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 673. 
 179 See generally ZGB. 
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Poland’s present regulation of marital agreements is quite new 
and was influenced by the above mentioned regulations, which 
have longer traditions and are well-established.180  Nonetheless, 
the concept of the marital agreement has a long history in 
Poland, especially when compared with the American history of 
premarital agreements.  Even in communist times, Polish law 
guaranteed spouses the possibility of contractually opting out of 
the standard statutory regime.181 
Marital agreements in Poland are special treaties for 
spouses.182  According to Polish law, the marital agreement 
(umowa majątkowa małżeńska, intercyza) is a contract concluded 
by spouses or prospective spouses in which their property is 
regulated in a different way than from the default statutory 
regime.183  The marital agreement also organizes the property of 
the spouses and dictates the ownership of each spouse as a rule 
in the future.184  The essence of marital agreements is that they 
classify property after the agreement comes into force.  However, 
it is also possible to conclude an agreement in which spouses 
introduce separation of property and divide their common 
property.185  In such a case, it is unclear whether this agreement 
should be treated as a marital agreement because it concerns the 
previous property as opposed to property which may be 
purchased in the future.186 
In Poland, freedom of contract in regards to marital 
agreements is limited.  Such limitations are justified by the aim 
for certainty of transactions, equity for spouses, and protection of 
family interests.187  Spouses are free to introduce regimes named 
in KRO article 47 § 1,188 but their freedom is confined to the 
systems provided by law.189  When the circumstances causing the 
mandatory regime have ceased, spouses who were in the 
mandatory regime may decide to reinstate the previous regime or 
 
 180 It is worth noting that from 1918, when Poland regained its independence, to the 
end of 1946, German law was in force in west and north Poland and the source of civil law 
in the central part of Poland was the Napoleonic Code, which was replaced by the civil 
code of the Kingdom of Poland based on the Napoleonic Code.  From 1836 to 1918, the 
matrimonial law in central Poland was regulated by provisions imposed by the tsarist 
authorities.  For further background, see Andrzej Mączyński, The Influence of European 
Family Law on the Family Law of Countries Acceding to the EU. The example of Poland, 
in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 239. 
 181 See DOMINIK LASOK, POLISH FAMILY LAW 92 (A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1968).  
 182 PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 240–41. 
 183 See generally KRO. 
 184 PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 240–41. 
 185 KRO art.47. 
 186 LASOK, supra note 181, at 92. 
 187 See PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 240–41. 
 188 KRO art. 47 § 1.  
 189 For further discussion, see LASOK supra note 181, at 89–96. 
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choose one of the regimes mentioned in KRO article 47 § 1.190  
The spouses cannot introduce any other regime apart from those 
regimes authorized by law.191 
If spouses do not choose another regime through their 
marital agreement, the default statutory regime is limited 
community of property,192 similar to that of French law.193  This 
means that there are three types of assets in the marriage: the 
community property, the separate property of the wife, and the 
separate property of the husband.  Both spouses own community 
property jointly, whether or not the property has been purchased 
jointly or separately.194  In this regime, however, spouses cannot 
change the rules concerning the management of property.195  This 
prohibition is in force for both the standard statutory regime of 
community of property and the contractual extended or limited 
community of property.196  Spouses are not allowed to modify the 
rules of the primary regime and the rules concerning the liability 
of spouses.197 
This statutory default of limited community of property is 
problematic, especially when either one or both of the spouses 
decide to start a commercial activity.  The rules of management 
and liability for debts may make it difficult to be a married 
entrepreneur or even a shareholder,198 increasing the importance 
of having alternate systems into which spouses may contract by 
means of a marital agreement. 
If the spouses decide to extend community property through 
their marital agreement, however, they are not able to choose 
universal community property199 and at least some chattels must 
belong to the separate property of each spouse, which is a group 
of chattels that cannot be part of community property.  These are 
enumerated in KRO article 49.200  Spouses are not allowed to 
 
 190 Id. 
 191 See id. 
 192 For further background on the property system in Poland, as well as on the 
separation of property, see Elżbieta Skowrońska-Bocian, Family and Succession Law, in 
INTRODUCTION TO POLISH LAW 85, 96–98 (Stanisław Frankowski ed., 2005). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Skowrońska-Bocian, supra note 192, at 97. 
 195 Id. at 98. 
 196 To contractually expand or limit community property, couples simply designate 
more or less of their property as community property.  See also infra note 204 and 
accompanying text. 
 197 See, e.g., KRO arts. 41 & 48. 
 198 For more details, see ANNA STĘPIEŃ-SPOREK, DZIAŁALNOŚĆ GOSPODARCZA Z 
UDZIAŁEM MAŁŻONKÓW (2009). 
 199 In this regime, all property is owned by the wife and husband in common.  See 
Carroll, supra note 24, at 27. 
 200 KRO art. 49. 
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extend the scope of community property to embrace inalienable 
rights, compensations for personal injury, or material damage or 
claims for remuneration for work or personal services 
outstanding at the time of the marriage.201  If the spouses decide 
on a contractual community of property (extended or limited), the 
rules of administration of community property from the statutory 
regime are applied.202  The agreement may have a provision for 
unequal division of common property upon the end of the 
regime.203 
According to KRO article 47 § 1, spouses may extend or limit 
community property,204 or choose separation of property205 or the 
sharing of accruals.206  If spouses choose extended or limited 
property, they may establish that in the case of the liquidation of 
the community of property, the fractions of each spouse will 
differ.  By choosing the sharing of accruals, spouses may also 
change the rules of calculation of accruals.207 
Therefore, the marital agreement regulates the spouses’ 
property during the duration of the chosen agreement.  Spouses 
are free to conclude different contracts, but only a few of these 
are considered marital agreements because they must fulfill 
certain conditions.  For example, marital agreements must take a 
special form in order to be valid: if spouses wish to change their 
matrimonial regime (either the statutory standard regime or the 
contractual regime), a notary must be involved.208 
Contrary to American law, the circumstances regarding the 
formation of the marital agreements in Poland are not as 
important and are rarely taken into account.  For example, 
Polish law does not pay significant attention to the fair disclosure 
of each spouse’s financial details.209  However, the general rules 
concerning defects of a will are applied to marital agreements, 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 KRO art. 47. 
 203 The end of the community regime is upon divorce, legal separation, nullity of 
marriage, the introduction of another property regime, the death of a spouse, or in 
situations when the compulsory regime is applied.  The compulsory regime is the 
separation of property.  See Skowrońska-Bocian, supra note 192, at 99. 
 204 See id. at 98–99. 
 205 In this regime, spouses hold their property separately. 
 206 This regime is similar to the German and Swiss statutory accrual system, as well 
as to the French deferred community (separation of acquisitions).  The general rule of this 
regime is that during marriage, each spouse is the sole owner of his or her separate 
property.  Upon termination of the regime, the surplus of separate property of both 
spouses is divided.  For further details, see Anna Stępień-Sporek, Rozdzielność 
Majątkowa z Wyrównaniem Dorobków, 7 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 73 (2008). 
 207 Anna Stępień-Sporek, Sharing of Accruals as the Best Solution for Marriage?, in 
FAMILY FINANCES, supra note 107 at 371, 375. 
 208 KRO art. 47. 
 209 See generally KRO. 
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i.e., the spouse should not be mistaken, under threat, or in a 
state of mind excluding the conscious making or expressing of the 
contract.210 
In Poland, marital agreements may be concluded by both 
spouses and prospective spouses.  If the marital agreement is 
concluded by prospective spouses, it will not come into force until 
they are married.  If a prospective spouse or a spouse does not 
have full legal capacity, the consent of the legal representative is 
necessary, as is the consent of the court.211  However, the marital 
agreement may also be concluded by a proxy.212  The form of the 
power of attorney is essential.  If the marital agreement is to be 
concluded by prospective spouses, the name of the other 
prospective spouse should not only be mentioned in the document 
of the power of attorney, but also given in notarial deed.213 
The marital agreement—which takes effect either at the 
moment of conclusion or as established by the spouses—can be 
changed as often as the spouses desire to change their financial 
relationships.214  A similar rule characterizes German and Swiss 
law.215 
The marital agreement in Poland has effects in relation to 
third parties if they are informed of the agreement and of the 
regime chosen by the spouses.216  This rule is essential.  The 
regime can affect creditors, who are protected by the above 
mentioned rule.  If the spouses have failed to inform third 
parties, however, the marital agreement does not have any effect 
on these third parties. In practice, this kind of situation is very 
common.  Third persons who are not aware of the existence of the 
marriage contract may assume that the spouses are married 
under the statutory system. 
In Poland, there is no special requirement to register a 
marital agreement,217 however, information about marital 
agreements can be published in commercial registers such as the 
Krajowy Rejestr Sądowy, the register of companies and stocks, or 
Ewidencja Działalności Gospodarczej, the register of individuals 
who are entrepreneurs. 
 
 210 See Kodeks cywilny – The Law of 23rd April 1964 – art. 82–88 [hereinafter “Kc”]. 
 211 See KRO art. 101 § 3. 
 212 Skowrońska-Bocian, supra note 192, at 92. 
 213 See Kc art. 99 § 1 and KRO art. 47. 
 214 KRO art. 47. 
 215 See Boele-Woelki, Matrimonial Property Law, supra note 138, at 7–8. 
 216 KRO art. 47. 
 217 See generally KRO. 
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III.  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
While European countries may differ slightly in their 
approaches to marital agreements, they all differ markedly from 
the American approach.218  These various contrasts illustrate the 
range of prospective spouses’ possibilities in premarital 
contracting, as well as the options that legislatures have in terms 
of regulating premarital agreements.  A comparison of these 
varying approaches to premarital agreements also offers 
important insights regarding the contractual autonomy of the 
parties, the possible characteristics of premarital agreements, 
and the popularity of such agreements. 
A. Contractual Autonomy of the Parties 
While European matrimonial property law is codified in each 
country’s civil code, the American tradition of freedom of contract 
provides spouses with the power to contract around state 
statutory law on the subject.219  Americans are therefore not 
restricted to the property regimes laid out in statutes—whether 
community property or equitable distribution—and may contract 
around them subject to few limitations by the court.220  In fact, 
spouses may even import into their agreements any of the 
European property systems, such as a system of accruals.221  
Meanwhile, Europeans are often limited to selecting one of the 
property regimes statutorily permitted in their countries.  
Although this permits them to avoid the statutory default, they 
must nonetheless select one of the regimes recognized by law.  
Only occasionally may spouses alter the rules of those European 
systems.  Americans therefore enjoy more autonomy in 
premarital contracting relative to Europeans. 
These differing levels of contractual autonomy have differing 
consequences.  For example, the general notion espoused by 
American law is that people should be able to manage their 
property as they choose,222 which also justifies the significant 
 
 218 Only continental Europe, which abides by the civil law system, differs markedly 
from the United States.  British common law is similar on this subject.  See supra note 
107. 
 219 See, e.g., DeMatteo v. DeMatteo 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (discussing freedom 
of contract with regard to American premarital agreements). 
 220 See supra Part I for further discussion. 
 221 See supra Part II. 
 222 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Shaffer, 733 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987): 
Because of this new freedom for marital partners to divide their property as 
they see fit, the old rule allowing the court to disregard the property division 
made by the parties in their [separation] agreement if the division does not 
conform to the trial court’s view of an equitable property division, no longer is 
appropriate. 
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freedom provided to people in the contracting of their wills.223  
Furthermore, limited contractual autonomy is criticized as being 
paternalistic and less efficient.224  However, one consequence of 
such significant contractual autonomy is that American courts 
must occasionally find a premarital agreement substantively 
unenforceable, particularly when one party’s imaginative 
contracting significantly disadvantages the other.  In the 
European countries considered, meanwhile, marital agreements 
will rarely be substantively or procedurally unenforceable 
because they must adhere to strict statutory requirements in the 
first place.  Furthermore, European spouses cannot introduce 
their own regime, but instead must select one of the statutory 
systems recognized by the law.  As the Polish approach 
illustrates, European courts may therefore be slower to find 
procedural defects in marital agreements.225  This may also be 
due to the fact that these marital agreements must be concluded 
in the presence of the public notary, whose significant role in civil 
law countries is much greater than in common law countries.226 
Nonetheless, there may be a relationship between 
contractual autonomy and the risk of an agreement’s 
unenforceability.  In other words, the less formulaic the 
premarital agreement, and the less deferential to statutory 
defaults, the more opportunity for a judicial declaration of 
unenforceability.  In the quest for the right legislative framework 
to regulate premarital or marital contracting, then, the task 
becomes to find the right balance between autonomy and the risk 
of unenforceability. 
However, complete autonomy may nonetheless be prioritized 
because it would permit prospective spouses to choose their own 
level of risk regarding the enforceability of their agreements.  Of 
course, permitting spouses unrestricted contractual autonomy, 
thereby allowing them to choose their agreement’s risk of 
 
See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
206, 223 (Peter Benson ed., Cambridge U. Press 2001) (“Autonomy theories of contract are 
based on the concept that allowing an individual to freely own and dispose of property and 
freely exercise his will to make choices concerning his person, labor, and property, is a 
value that is paramount.”). 
 223 See, e.g., Trent J. Thornley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the 
Foundation of Undue Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 516 (1996) (“The freedom of 
testamentary disposition is a basic principle of property law.  Though not a constitutional 
right, many states recognize freedom of testation as a deeply ingrained tradition in our 
society.”).  See also supra Part I.D.2. 
 224 See supra notes 78 and 81. 
 225 See supra Part II.B. 
 226 See JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 
30, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2009). 
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unenforceability, requires somewhat perfect information.  
Prospective spouses must not only know that straying from 
formulaic premarital agreements—as well as from typical 
legislative defaults—increases their agreements’ risk of 
unenforceability, but they must also be aware of the advantages 
and disadvantages of choosing particular property regimes and 
contractual provisions.  A lawyer representing each side could 
help assure this. 
Another consequence of unbounded autonomy of premarital 
contracting, however, is that the courts must continually 
determine the enforceability of each individual agreement before 
applying its provisions to a divorce.  Scarce judicial resources 
must therefore be spent, despite the American judiciary’s 
traditional reluctance to meddle in family matters.227  
Therefore, keeping prospective spouses informed of their 
options and expending judicial resources to monitor premarital 
agreements are the consequences to a high level of autonomy in 
premarital contracting, as illustrated by the American approach 
to premarital agreements and a comparison of it to European 
approaches.  Nonetheless, every jurisdiction, whether an 
American state or an European country, must choose its own 
balance among these factors and costs. 
B. Potential Characteristics of Premarital Agreements 
In searching for an appropriate regulatory framework for 
premarital contracting, as well as the proper content of such 
agreements, it is instructive to analyze the desirability of the 
differing approaches to these agreements, including those that 
deal with aspects beyond the freedom of contract already 
considered.228 
For example, some European countries permit, or even 
require, the registration of marital agreements in order to protect 
third parties.229  This registration aims to give creditors notice as 
to which assets are available for collection.  There is a similar 
requirement in some American community property states for 
the recording of separation of property agreements.230  To give 
 
 227 As the courts do not typically become involved in the financial arrangements of 
intact families, spouses are permitted to determine their own responsibilities during 
marriage.  See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d. 885 (Ala. 1958); State v. Rhodes, 61 
N.C. 453 (N.C. 1868). 
 228 See supra Part III.A. 
 229 See supra Part II for examples and discussion. 
 230 Carroll, supra note 24, at 32. 
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adequate notice to creditors, the agreement binds the spouses 
once executed, but binds third-party creditors only if recorded.231 
Such registration indeed serves an important, albeit lesser-
known, purpose of premarital agreements, which is to organize 
how the spouses hold their assets during the marriage.  If 
spouses hold their property differently from the statutory 
default, it may be only fair to give notice of this arrangement to 
third parties who potentially rely on the spouses’ property 
holdings when extending credit. 
A third party would be most disadvantaged by a couple 
secretly opting out of a community property default.  In such a 
case, the third party would ordinarily expect all of the marital 
assets to be held by each spouse, when in reality, each spouse 
holds smaller assets separately.  However as already mentioned, 
only a minority of American states utilizes community property 
as the default system, whereas some European countries use this 
system as their statutory default.  Therefore, public registration 
of marital agreements is significantly more relevant in the 
European context. 
Americans, meanwhile, maintain the confidentiality of 
premarital agreements.232  This effectively reduces third parties’ 
ability to rely on such agreements.  Such confidentiality also 
permits prospective spouses in the United States to contract on 
intimate details and on their private financial situations.  In this 
way, however, American premarital agreements are often limited 
to affecting only the married couples who are parties to the 
agreements. 
Finally, in many European countries, prospective spouses 
must adhere to particular formalities in order to conclude a 
legally enforceable premarital agreement, such as signing the 
agreement in front of a notary.233  There is no such definitive list 
of requirements in the United States, although a court may 
subsequently analyze the procedural fairness of the agreement 
when called upon to enforce the document.234  Such procedural 
review may, however, increase the opportunity for the court to 
find a premarital agreement unenforceable.235  The level of 
required formality will therefore inevitably vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction as each adopts a particular balance between 
 
 231 See, e.g., id. 
 232 Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 153. 
 233 See, e.g., supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 234 See supra Part I.D.1. 
 235 See supra Part III.A. 
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permitting contractual autonomy and protecting the parties from 
fraud. 
Therefore, choices must be made not only among premarital 
contracting options, but also among the different regulatory 
frameworks for such agreements.  In choosing the appropriate 
model, each jurisdiction and couple must therefore weigh the 
costs of their choices. 
C. Popularity of Premarital Agreements 
Premarital agreements are more popular in the United 
States than in Europe, but not particularly popular in either.236  
There may be several explanations for this current lack of 
popularity in premarital contracting on both continents.  Many 
commentators suspect, however, that the agreements’ popularity 
will increase in the near future.237 
Importantly, premarital agreements in the United States 
might be rare because they need not necessarily be drafted for a 
higher income prospective spouse to avoid an unfavorable 
statutory default.  This is because the higher income earner 
would prefer an equitable distribution regime, which often 
results in an unequal distribution, rather than a community 
property one, which instead results in an equal division of 
assets.238  However, most American states use equitable 
distribution as the default, mooting the need to alter this regime 
through a premarital agreement.  Many European countries, on 
the other hand, have a statutory default of some type of 
 
 236 In the United States, however, the use of premarital agreements tripled between 
1978 and 1988 alone.  Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 151.  “Although it is difficult to 
get statistics on premarital agreements, it appears that 5% to 10% of couples marrying for 
the first time and 20% of remarried couples now enter into premarital agreements.”  
Brian McDonald, Presentation to the Western Trial Lawyers Association (June 2005) 
(transcript available at http://www.spomcman.com/doc/PREMARITAL%20 
AGREEMENTS.doc).  Meanwhile, only 2% of British couples marrying seek a premarital 
agreement.  Divorce Lawyers Braced for Busiest Week Ever, TIMES ONLINE, January 5, 
2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5450552.ece.  In France, 
only 10% of spouses conclude a marital agreement, and they do so mostly when important 
assets or second marriages are involved.  See HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 261. 
 237 “Premarital agreements are gaining popularity as more people become conscious 
of the extensive financial rights and obligations arising out of a marriage, and the 
increasing statistical chance that any marriage will end in divorce.”  In re Marriage of 
Leathers, 789 P.2d 263, 265 n.5 (Or. 1990) (quoting 12 ABA Family Advocate, No. 3, 54–
55 (Winter 1990)).  See also Jennifer Kim, Contesting the Enforceability of a Premarital 
Agreement, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 133, 133 (2000); Jennifer L. McCoy, Comment, 
Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of Problems in Current Alimony Law, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 501, 523 (2005). 
 238 For further background on the relationship between equitable distribution and 
community property regimes and their European counterparts, see Carroll, supra note 24, 
at 1. 
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community property, which might sooner prompt a higher 
income earner to seek a premarital agreement.239 
Nonetheless, Americans may use premarital agreements to 
regulate many of their rights and responsibilities during 
marriage and divorce, particularly in regards to specific assets 
they own.  Premarital agreements are especially useful to 
prospective spouses who fit a particular profile.  For example, 
people with children from previous marriages may choose to 
protect these children’s financial future by virtue of a premarital 
agreement.240  People may also utilize such agreements when 
they are skeptical of the institution of marriage because of their 
own, or their parents’, failed marriages.241  Premarital 
agreements may also be more common among prospective 
spouses with significant income or age disparities.242  Further, 
prospective spouses may choose to keep their property separate 
by such agreements so that one can use only his or her portion in 
paying off debts.243  Finally, when one partner expects to inherit 
significant money or a family business, she may decide to request 
a premarital agreement.244 
Still, premarital agreements are not frequently used in 
either Europe or the United States, with most commentators 
estimating that less than 10% of any of these populations use 
such agreements.245  In Europe, this may be due to a potential 
misunderstanding of the role of the premarital agreement, which 
most Europeans associate with American celebrity divorces,246 
although the meaning and consequences of premarital 
agreements in Europe differ from those in the United States.247  
In the United States, meanwhile, the limited use of the 
premarital agreement may be due to Americans’ rather 
unrealistic sense of optimism regarding their marriages and 
their fear of signaling divorce.248  This, as well as the need to 
 
 239 However, it is true that premarital agreements are unpopular in Europe, as well.  
See supra notes 101, 236 and accompanying text. 
 240 Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 152. 
 241 Id. at 151. 
 242 Id. at 152. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 See supra note 236. 
 246 See supra Part II.A.  This may also be because the average premarital agreement 
is highly confidential.  Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 153. 
 247 See supra Parts I and II. 
 248 For the argument that most couples are overly optimistic about their marriages, 
see Margaret F. Brinig, FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 64, at 276 
and Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism 
in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 
757–61 (2008).  See also supra note 2. 
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protect children from a previous marriage,249 may also explain 
why many people are more likely to seek premarital agreements 
upon second and subsequent marriages.  Nonetheless, many 
prospective spouses around the world are currently choosing not 
to pursue the benefits offered by premarital contracting, 
although this may change in the near future. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the premarital agreement permits prospective 
spouses around the world to circumvent their jurisdiction’s 
judicial and statutory defaults in organizing the terms of their 
marriage and potential divorce.  To achieve this force in the 
United States, the premarital agreement has particularly 
undergone significant development over the course of the past 
few decades. 
Although the American history of the premarital agreement 
is relatively short compared to its European counterpart, 
Americans have quickly achieved unparalleled levels of freedom 
in marital contracting.  This heightened freedom of contract has 
become one of the most significant differences between the 
continental European and American approaches to such 
agreements. 
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of these various 
approaches suggests that the level of autonomy in marital 
contracts implicates the risk of the agreement’s unenforceability 
by the courts.  A comparative study also offers some insights into 
improving the regulatory frameworks governing these 
agreements, as well as the reasons behind people’s reluctance to 
use such agreements. 
In conclusion, although the premarital agreement has 
attained significant stability and enforceability in countries 
around the world, issues surrounding such agreements 
undoubtedly remain.  Specifically, premarital agreements in the 
United States are subject to procedural and substantive review.  
They also raise universal public policy issues, particularly in the 
case of mobile couples, concerning the meaning of fairness and 
the limits on freedom of contract.  As state courts and 
legislatures continue to encounter and address these issues, they 
may therefore greatly benefit from a comparative study of such 
agreements. 
 
 249 Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 229, 238–39 (1994). 
